Hazard Analysis Guidelines For Transit Projects

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Hazard Analysis Guidelines For Transit Projects

Transcript Of Hazard Analysis Guidelines For Transit Projects

U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Transit Administration

DOT-FTA-MA- 26-5005-00-01 DOT-VNTSC-FTA-00-01
HAZARD ANALYSIS GUIDELINES FOR TRANSIT PROJECTS

U.S. Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center Cambridge, MA 02142-1093

Final Report January 2000

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55 FTA
Federal Transit Administration

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FTA OFFICE OF SAFETY AND SECURITY

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)

2. REPORT DATE
January 2000

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Final Report March 1998 - January 2000

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Hazard Analysis Guidelines for Transit Projects
6. AUTHOR(S)

5. FUNDING NUMBERS
U9170/TM899

R. J. Adduci, W. T. Hathaway, L. J. Meadow

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
U. S. Department of Transportation Research and Special Programs Administration Volpe National Transportation Systems Center 55 Broadway, Kendall Sq. Cambridge, MA 02142-1093

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
DOT-VNTSC-FTA-00-01

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Transit Administration Office of Program Management, Office of Safety and Security Washington, DC 20590
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
FTA-MA-26-5005-00-01

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
A printed copy of this document is available to the public through the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161. An electronic version of this document is also available at http://transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov.

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
These hazard analysis guidelines discuss safety critical systems and subsystems, types of hazard analyses, when hazard analyses should be performed, and the hazard analysis philosophy. These guidelines are published by FTA to assist the transit industry as well as state and local organizations in providing the highest practical level of safety and security for the passengers and employees of the Nation’s mass transportation systems. These guidelines apply to all transit projects that are directly related to the transport of passengers.

14. SUBJECT TERMS
Hazard analysis, transit system safety, safety critical systems, transit, project life cycle

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
Unclassified
NSN 7540-01-280-5500

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified

15. NUMBER OF PAGES
44
16. PRICE CODE
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
298-102

PREFACE These guidelines represent the cooperative efforts of many people. The authors give special thanks to Ms. Judy Z. Meade, Mr. Jerry Fisher, and Mr. Roy Field of the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA) Office of Safety and Security. They would also like to thank Korve Engineering for their overall contribution to this project. Thanks are also due to Ms. Annabelle Boyd and Mr. James Caton of Boyd/Maier, Inc., and Mr. Brian Moriarty of TRW for their support and technical review of the report. Also, thanks are also extended to Mr. James Harrison for his contribution in the overall review and preparation of this report. Their combined efforts greatly improved the content of this document.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section

Page

1. INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................... 1

1.1 Purpose ................................................................................................................................. 1 1.2 Scope ................................................................................................................................. 1 1.3 Applicability......................................................................................................................... 1

2. SAFETY ANALYSES............................................................................................................... 3

2.1 Safety Critical Systems ........................................................................................................ 3 2.2 Hazard Identification and Resolution Process ..................................................................... 3 2.3 Schedule for Hazard Analyses ............................................................................................. 6

3. DEFINITIONS FOR HAZARD ANALYSES........................................................................... 9

3.1 Safety Principles................................................................................................................. 12 3.2 Required Hazard Analyses ................................................................................................. 12
3.2.1 Overview..................................................................................................................... 12

4. REFERENCES......................................................................................................................... 25

APPENDIX A. EXAMPLES OF A GENERIC HAZARD CHECKLIST ................................... 27 APPENDIX B. DEFINITIONS..................................................................................................... 33 APPENDIX C. LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................ 35

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

Page

1. Hazard Resolution Process................................................................................................... 4 2. Transit Project Life Cycle/Required Hazard Analysis......................................................... 7

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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 PURPOSE A primary goal of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) is to assist the transit industry as well as state and local organizations in providing the highest practical level of safety and security for the passengers and employees of the Nation’s mass transportation systems. The FTA is publishing these hazard analysis guidelines to further this goal. In addition, the hazard analysis guidelines presented in this document are in response to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendation R-97-22 that requires the FTA to:
“Revise the grant application process to require a comprehensive failure modes and effects analysis, including a human factors analysis, be provided for all federally funded projects that are directly related to the transport of passengers.”
1.2 SCOPE This document presents guidelines for the preparation of hazard analyses to assist local authorities in developing a safe and secure transit system. The guidelines discuss safety critical systems and subsystems, types of hazard analyses, when hazard analyses should be performed, and the hazard analysis philosophy.
1.3 APPLICABILITY These guidelines apply to all transit projects that are directly related to the transport of passengers.
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2. SAFETY ANALYSES
A key objective of any transit project is to provide a safe and reliable system. Transit agency personnel, consultants, and contractors are expected to implement high standards of safety and system assurance throughout the planning, design, construction, fabrication, installation, testing, pre-operational, and operational system phases of all transit projects during the life cycle of the system. The transit system’s System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) is designed to eliminate and/or control identified hazards. Hazards that cannot be eliminated in the design are to be controlled by providing safety devices, warning devices, adequate training, and written instructions to transit system personnel to prevent accidents.
Safety analyses are part of a formalized process to identify, eliminate, and/or control hazards (see Figure 1). Safety analyses provide for:
•= Identification of hazards •= Assessment of the severity and probability of occurrence of the hazard •= Timely awareness of hazards for those who must resolve them •= Traceability and control of hazards through all phases of a system’s life cycle.
Safety analyses are essential to the preventive and proactive aspect of the system safety program. The primary purpose of safety analyses is to identify and describe hazards that might arise from flaws and fault conditions in the design and operation of a system or subsystem.
Major inputs to the hazard analyses come from the design data, drawings, operational plans and concepts, and from the experience of the analyst.
2.1 SAFETY CRITICAL SYSTEMS
Certain systems and subsystems in the design and development of transit systems are safety critical. Hazard analyses must be performed on these systems to identify potential safety problems. These systems and subsystems typically include train control, fire and emergency systems including ventilation, passenger vehicle (bus and rail), traction power, communications, and material selection.
Appendix A provides a list of generic hazards that can occur within a transit system.
2.2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION PROCESS
A hazard analysis should be performed on all facility modification and new construction projects. The Hazard Identification and Resolution Process is shown in Figure 1.
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DEFINE THE SYSTEM
•= DEFINE THE PHYSICAL AND FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, AND UNDERSTAND AND EVALUATE THE PEOPLE, PROCEDURES, FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, AND THE ENVIRONMENT.
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IDENTIFY HAZARDS
•= IDENTIFY HAZARDS AND UNDESIRED EVENTS •= DETERMINE THE CAUSES OF HAZARDS
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ASSESS HAZARDS
•= DETERMINE SEVERITY •= DETERMINE PROBABILITY •= DECIDE TO ACCEPT RISK OR ELIMINATE/CONTROL
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RESOLVE HAZARDS
•= ASSUME RISK OR •= IMPLEMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION
- ELIMINATE - CONTROL
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FOLLOW-UP
•= MONITOR FOR EFFECTIVENESS •= MONITOR FOR UNEXPECTED HAZARDS
Figure 1. Hazard Resolution Process
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System Definition
The first step in the hazard resolution process is to define the physical and functional characteristics of the system to be analyzed. These characteristics are presented in terms of the major elements, which make up the system: equipment, procedures, people and environment. A knowledge and understanding of how the individual system elements interface with each other is essential to the hazard identification effort.
Hazard Identification
The second step in the hazard resolution process involves the identification of hazards and the determination of their causes. There are five basic methods of hazard identification that may be employed to identify hazards:
•= Data from previous accidents (case studies) or operating experience •= Scenario development and judgment of knowledgeable individuals •= Generic hazard checklists •= Formal hazard analysis techniques •= Design data and drawings.
When identifying the safety hazards present in a system, every effort should be made to identify and catalog the whole universe of potential hazards.
There are several hazard analysis techniques that should be considered to assist in the evaluation of potential hazards and to document their resolution including a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and Operating Hazard Analysis (OHA). These analyses should be conducted in accordance with the latest version MIL-STD-882 (D). This standard provides uniform requirements for developing and implementing a system safety program of sufficient comprehensiveness to identify the hazards of a system and to impose design requirements and management controls to prevent mishaps. The system safety program addresses hazards from many sources, including system design, hazardous materials, advancing technologies, and new techniques.
Hazard Assessment
The third step in the hazard resolution process is to assess the identified hazards in terms of the severity or consequence of the hazard and the probability of occurrence of each type of hazard. This should be accomplished in general conformity with the latest MIL-STD-882 (D).
Hazard Resolution
After the hazard assessment is completed, hazards can be resolved by deciding to either assume the risk associated with the hazard or to eliminate or control the hazard. The hazard reduction precedence is as follows:
•= Design to eliminate or reduce the hazard
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•= Provide safety devices •= Provide warning devices •= Institute special procedures or training •= Accept the hazard •= Eliminate the use of the system/subsystem/equipment that creates an unacceptable
hazard.
Various strategies or countermeasures can be employed in reducing the risk to a level acceptable to management.
Risk assessment should be used as the basis for the decision-making process to determine whether individual facility, system or subsystem hazards should be eliminated, mitigated or accepted. Hazards should be resolved through a design process that emphasizes elimination of the hazard.
Follow-up
The last step in the hazard resolution process is follow-up. It is necessary to monitor the effectiveness of recommended countermeasures and ensure that new hazards are not introduced as a result. In addition, whenever changes are made to any of the system elements (equipment, procedures, people and/or environment), a hazard analysis should be conducted to identify and resolve any new hazards.
2.3 Schedule for Hazard Analyses
Hazard analyses are performed in various stages of the transit project life cycle, as shown in Figure 2. They become part of the safety certification process for the system. Safety certification is necessary prior to opening of new facilities and systems, in addition to modifications of existing systems. The objective of the Safety Certification program is to produce a formal document that ensures at the time of operation and through its life cycle, a particular system is safe for passengers, employees, emergency responders, and the general public. (Safety certification is the process of verifying that certifiable elements comply with a formal list of safety requirements. The requirements are defined by design criteria, contract specifications, applicable codes, and industry standards)
•= The concept-planning phase begins with the decision to build and ends at the onset of preliminary design. A Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is performed during this stage.
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