(U) Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion Operations in
Transcript Of (U) Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion Operations in
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(U) Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion Operations in Afghanistan
(U) Lessons and Observations From
4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion July 2009 – May 2010
26 July 2010
This unclassified document has been reviewed in accordance with guidance contained in United States Central Command Security Classification Regulation 380-14 dated 13 January 2009. This document contains information EXEMPT FROM MANDATORY DISCLOSURE under the FOIA. DoD Regulation 5400.7R, Exemption 5 applies.
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(U) Purpose: To inform Deputy Commandants (DCs) Combat Development and Integration (CD&I), Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O), Installations and Logistics (I&L) Commanding General (CG), Training and Education Command (TECOM), Director of Intelligence, and others on results of a March 2010 collection effort to document lessons and observations from 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (4th LAR).
Bottom Line Up Front:
(U//FOUO) The battalion mobilized one month prior to participating in Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV). Other than for drill weekends prior to mobilization, this four week period was the only time allotted for pre-deployment training (PTP). While the unit was able to meet all of its requirements, a longer mobilization period should be the goal.
(U//FOUO) During drill weekends, the battalion’s main effort was crew cohesion, conducting gunnery and scout integration and platoon level tactics, focusing on “brilliance of the basics.”
(U//FOUO) EMV was still in the process of converting from Iraq to an Afghanistan focus. It was also oriented around a standard infantry battalion and not an LAR unit.
(U//FOUO) The primary mission of the battalion is combined arms reconnaissance and security missions to shape the battlespace. Many of the operations conducted in Afghanistan were not typical LAR operations.
(U//FOUO) As with other units in Afghanistan, 4th LAR operated in a dispersed and distributed manner, often out of platoon size patrol bases. If such operations continue, the numbers of each vehicle variants may have to be modified to better support them.
(U//FOUO) Fluctuating information on force cap restrictions impacted the mobilization process and the decisions made on the final composition of the unit.
(U//FOUO) The late decision to mobilize the battalion impacted the mobilization process for Navy medical personnel and contributed to the delayed arrival of corpsmen to support the battalion.
(U//FOUO) The lack of replacements for casualties in country increased what was already a shortage of light armored vehicle (LAV) crewman for some of the companies.
(U//FOUO) Marine Corps Base (MCB), Camp Pendleton is a particularly well-suited intermediate location (ILOC) site for mobilizing reserve units, due to its proximity to Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms and EMV, although it may require more capacity and resources to support multiple units.
(U//FOUO) Some Marines continue to outfit themselves with personally procured equipment and gear.
(U//FOUO) While the upgraded LAV, the A2 variant, generally received praise as an overall improvement, many considered it underpowered with the Ballistic Protection Upgrade Package (BPUP) armor additions mounted.
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(U) Recommendations suggested by content of interviews include the following topics and associated doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) pillars.
Recommendation
DOTMLP F
1. (U//FOUO) Increase the number of number of data network specialists on the
X
X
table of organization (T/O)
2. (U//FOUO) Install a power inverter in the LAV
X
3. (U//FOUO) Install an auxiliary power unit (APU) in the LAV
X
4. (U//FOUO) Attach linguists as early in the training period as possible.
X
X
5. (U//FOUO) Deploy LAR units at or above the T/O required number of LAV
X
X
crewmen.
6. (U//FOUO) Supply units with the equipment needed to test turret electronics.
X
7. (U//FOUO) Mobilize reserve units in a timely manner.
X
X X
8. (U//FOUO) Train during PTP on the equipment that will be used in theater.
X
X
9. (U//FOUO) Upgrade all LAVs with Generation II suspensions and more
X
powerful engines.
10. (U//FOUO) Upgrade the communication and computer systems in the
X
command and control variant.
11. (U//FOUO) Determine whether current LAV variants adequately support anticipated future operations.
X
X XX
(U) The remainder of this report contains more detailed background and rationale on the above and other topics. An unclassified version of this report is available at www.mccll.usmc.mil.
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Table of Contents PROLOGUE ............................................................................................................5 BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................6 ORGANIZATION AND MANNING ...........................................................................7 MOBILIZATION .....................................................................................................8 ILOC ....................................................................................................................9 PTP .......................................................................................................................9 EQUIPPING ..........................................................................................................10 OPERATIONS .......................................................................................................15 RECOMMENDATIONS (DOTMLPF PILLAR) .....................................................22 SUMMARY ...........................................................................................................22 ENDNOTES...........................................................................................................23
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Prologue
(U) This report is one of many publications addressing a wide array of topics assembled and produced by the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned. The MCCLL library is not to be considered a sole or authoritative source, and was not designed as such. MCCLL provides a vehicle to inform the operating forces in the queue for subsequent deployments, the DOTMLPF stakeholders, and the advocates of the unvarnished experiences of Marines engaged in operations. Reporting or relaying these experiences may provide the impetus to effect a change in any or all of the DOTMLPF pillars. (U) MCCLL relies on the individual Marine and commands to provide their hard learned lessons in order to disseminate them throughout the Marine Corps. The goal is to get these knowledge jewels into the MCCLL Lesson Management System in order to disseminate them in such a timely manner as to make them invaluable to the next Marine in the deployment queue.
C. H. Sonntag Director, Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned
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Background
(U) This report is a continuation of the collection effort on units supporting operations in Afghanistan as directed by the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration. The collection sought to examine the mission, scope, successes, shortfalls, equipment, manning and emerging issues associated with 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (4th LAR) operations. Interviews of 28 commanders and staff were conducted at various camps and bases in Afghanistan from December 2009 – April 2010. Those interviews cited as endnotes in this report are available in the search enabled MCCLL database at www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil, and can be located by doing a MCCLL site search (Action Menu on left of screen) on the individual‟s last name. (U) The collection also included a survey of some members of the unit. 1
(U) Fourth LAR is a reserve battalion which consists of 7 companies.
Headquarters and Service (H&S) Company and Company A are located in Camp Pendleton, California.
Company B is in Frederick, Maryland.
Company C is in Riverton, Utah.
Company D is in Quantico, Virginia.
Company E is in Syracuse, New York.
Company F is in Eastover, South Carolina.
(U//FOUO) The only companies to participate in the deployment were H&S, A, B, and C, although Company A, 2d LAR also participated in Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV) but deployed separately. Prior to this deployment, the standard practice was to attach individual reserve companies to other units in support of operations.
(U) There was a period of active duty for training (AT) for Companies A, B, and H&S scheduled for June 2009 at Ft Irwin, California. The battalion rescheduled it for July and moved it to Camp Pendleton in anticipation of mobilization, which occurred 1 August 2009. The period was used to complete blocks I and II of the mandated Predeployment Training Program (PTP).
(U) Company C mobilized 20 July 2009 and deployed to Camp Pendleton where it conducted PTP prior to the rest of the battalion mobilizing on 1 August 2009, and the start of unit training at its intermediate location (ILOC), Camp Pendleton. After only a month of training, the battalion moved to 29 Palms, California to participate in EMV.
(U) The LAR battalion performs combined arms reconnaissance and security missions in support of the ground combat element (GCE). Its mission is to conduct reconnaissance, security and economy of force operations, and, within its capabilities, limited offensive or defensive operations that exploit the unit‟s mobility and firepower. 2
(U//FOUO) The relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA) with 2d LAR occurred in November 2009. In addition to responsibilities in southern Helmand, 4th LAR provided 120 man detachments for the tactical security force (base security and quick reaction force (QRF) missions) at both Camp Dwyer and Camp Leatherneck through January 2010. Subsequently, 4th LAR operated out of combat outpost (COP) Payne and patrol base (PB) Khan Neshin Castle.
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(MATERIAL IS OMITTED FROM THIS PORTION DUE TO CLASSIFICATION. SEE CLASSIFIED REPORT)
Organization and Manning
Sourcing
(U//FOUO) While battalion leadership was informally aware that it would be deploying in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the decision was not made to mobilize the battalion until early summer 2009. Another course of action considered was to use an active duty H&S company as the headquarters for the reserve LAR companies. Earlier notice for the activation would have been extremely helpful and given the battalion more time to prepare.
(U//FOUO) Of the Marines who deployed, 90% were selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) Marines from 4th LAR, which included Marines from companies that did not deploy. There were 25 SMCR augments from outside 4th LAR, 8-9 Inspector and Instructor (I&I) staff, and 2 other active duty augments.
(U//FOUO) A force end strength constraint imposed on the battalion by higher headquarters was a substantial issue primarily because it was not set. The number of Marines to deploy with the battalion varied between 400 and 1000 and changed frequently. In the end, more Marines were ready to deploy than could be taken.
(U//FOUO) The battalion received no replacements for combat casualties which resulted in reduced capability due to the lack of certain military occupational specialties (MOSs), especially 0313 LAV crewmen.
(U//FOUO) The civilian education level and backgrounds, particularly law enforcement, of the Reserve Marines were cited as a positive by the leadership in the battalion. According to survey responses, 74% reported having at least some college and 17% had a civilian law enforcement background.
(U//FOUO) While they were able to “get the job done,” Reserve Marines need more than thirty days notice before mobilization.
Navy Sourcing
(U//FOUO) Many of the Navy corpsmen did not join the unit until after mobilization. They were not organic to the battalion and arrived from many different locations, often with no service record book (SRB).
(U//FOUO) The battalion commander viewed the Navy‟s activation process as inflexible. It needs to be more user-friendly, more focused on supporting the Marine Corps with the corpsmen who need to be integrated well in advance of training and not just prior to a major event or deploying into theater. 3
(U//FOUO) The short notice mobilization decision was a factor in the timing of Navy personnel joining the unit. 4
MOS Issues
(U//FOUO) Many leaders noted a shortage of LAV crewmen, MOS 0313. Company C deployed slightly under the table of organization (T/O) number of 49, and subsequently lost approximately two crews‟ worth [MCCLL note: The LAV-25 crew consists of a driver, gunner and vehicle commander. ] The typical solution was to use mechanics as drivers. 5
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(U//FOUO) The battalion had only two MOS 0651 data network specialist Marines to assist in the operation and maintenance of many new communication systems, nearly a regimental suite worth of equipment. While the unit rates four 0651s by T/O, infantry battalions deploying to OEF have as many as nine and are requesting more. 6
Reserve Issues
(U//FOUO) Prior to mobilization, another course of action (COA) under consideration was to attach the reserve LAR companies to an active duty tank battalion headquarters. There is a belief that reserve LAR battalions do not operate as battalions enough to be effective and that it would be better to attach individual reserve companies to an active duty tank battalion. Due to geographic separation and other issues it can be very difficult for reserve LAR battalions to train and deploy together. By the time the decision was made to deploy the LAR battalion, the delay in activating the unit resulted in a workup period that was about a month shorter than many on the staff thought would be optimal and far shorter than the PTP period of an active duty battalion.
Mobilization
Pre-mobilization Issues
(U//FOUO) Companies A and B had sufficient notice about the impending mobilization to adjust their drill schedules, adding in some longer drill weekends of three and four days. To the extent possible, the battalion pushed units to complete PTP requirements on drill weekends but there was only so much training that could be completed during those weekends.
(U//FOUO) Company C learned of the mobilization about two months prior while participating in Exercise African Lion in Morocco, Algeria. Figure 2 is a more optimal timeline for activation of a reserve unit.
Figure 1: Activation Timeline
(U//FOUO) Trainers simulating the upgraded A2 LAV turret were helpful in preparing Marines prior to mobilization. Company C had the turret trainer and recent 0313 graduates of the LAV crewman course at the School of Infantry at Camp Pendleton, CA had trained on the A2 turret.
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The LAVs the battalion would acquire in theater were upgraded A2 variants, so it was important that they train on the system they would be using.
ILOC
(U//FOUO) The unit leadership stated that the ILOC training period was too compressed. A period two to three weeks longer was seen as a reasonable compromise, which would have resulted in four months between mobilization and deployment vice the three that occurred.
(U//FOUO) Camp Pendleton was extremely crowded during ILOC. Staff and officers were billeted at hotels and Marines moved into barracks on the same day that another reserve battalion was departing. The battalion trained and operated effectively but the impact of multiple additional using units must be taken into consideration if Camp Pendleton continues to be the ILOC location of choice due to its proximity to 29 Palms and EMV.
PTP
(U//FOUO) Due to the battalion‟s mission and the compressed nature of the PTP period, the more “standard” events, such as swim qualification, were seen by some as unnecessary impingements on the other training that needed to be accomplished. 7
(U//FOUO) The timeframe in which the battalion had to complete its PTP resulted in a perception of being “focused on checking boxes.” 8 Requirements were seen as constantly changing, with no consistent list or source available. There was very little “white space” left for company or platoon level training between PTP and battalion requirements. 9
(U//FOUO) Vehicle crews and scouts often trained separately. Integrated training is necessary, to include training with crewmen dismounted, as this happens frequently in Afghanistan.
(U//FOUO) The battalion commander, along with his principal staff officers, conducted a predeployment site survey (PDSS) during the last two weeks of August. This visit was cited as a crucial part of the unit‟s subsequent success in EMV and during operations in Afghanistan, despite the resulting absence of key leadership for a significant portion of PTP.
(U//FOUO) The battalion maintenance officer recommended that one of the officers in the unit attend the full electronic warfare officer‟s course and not just the condensed version in theater in order to better understand, employ, and maintain the systems available in theater, primarily the C-IED systems. 10
Enhanced Mojave Viper
(U//FOUO) EMV was in transition between an Iraq focus and an Afghanistan focus. For example, there were still „sheik‟ role players. EMV seemed geared toward regular infantry and not an LAR battalion. Only forty-eight percent of the survey respondents agreed that PTP was adequately focused on operations in Afghanistan rather than Iraq, and only twenty-eight percent said EMV was valuable in preparing them for operations in Afghanistan.
(U//FOUO) The counter improvised explosive device (C-IED) training at EMV was valuable, but it was much shorter than combined arms training evolutions (CAX). These exercises against large units of Soviet style armor were not good preparation for COIN operations in Afghanistan. However, it was still valuable training especially for command and control purposes and deconflicting fires. Company commanders stated that they were “pawns on a chess board,” and conducted less live fire than during similar evolutions when they were on active duty. 11
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(U//FOUO) More exposure to Ground-Based Operational Surveillance System (G-BOSS) and biometric systems, both before and during EMV, would have been beneficial.
(U//FOUO) With companies and platoons regularly operating from separate COPSs and FOBs, more training should have been focused at those levels, especially during EMV. 12
Cultural and Language Training
(U//FOUO) In general, leaders ranked the cultural training as being somewhat more important than the language training. Understanding the culture and customs of the country was seen as the most important part of COIN training. Good linguists can also train Marines in cultural issues.
(U//FOUO) The short period before deployment limited the amount of language training that the Marines received. More training would have been beneficial, but there was not enough time. Even the minimal training was seen as very useful. Knowing just a few phrases builds credibility with local populations.
(U//FOUO) In some areas of the AO the local nationals speak Balochi, but Marines received only Pashto training.
Pre-deployment Intelligence Support
(U//FOUO) Reserve units typically have small S-2 sections while in reserve status. Fourth LAR had two analysts and an infantryman serving as S-2 chief until just prior to mobilization. Before August 2009, there was little opportunity for the S-2 to brief the battalion staff on the AO for which they would be responsible.
(U//FOUO) Having just one secret internet protocol router (SIPR) computer during ILOC/PTP was a major hindrance to developing the intelligence picture. First LAR supported the battalion by providing access to its SIPR vault on weekends.
Equipping
Vehicle Assets
(U//FOUO) Half of the battalion‟s vehicles arrived during the deployment. The approximate numbers of 4th LAR vehicle assets available in theater were:
115 LAVs of all variants
80 other vehicles, including 25 Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) vehicles, 24 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, and 17 MRAP All Terrain Vehicles (MATVs).
Maintenance
(U//FOUO) At the beginning of the deployment, about 10 of 60 LAVs the battalion acquired were dead-lined. By the end of March 2010, the number was 20 out of 115, some from IED strikes, and beyond the repair capability of 4th LAR.
(U//FOUO) There were no maintenance issues unique to Afghanistan. The environment was similar to Iraq or 29 Palms, and maintenance issues were generally the same.
(U//FOUO) The availability of spare parts was a challenge. Parts often arrived at Camp Leatherneck in as little as two days from the United States, but then took 3 weeks to reach COP
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(U) Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion Operations in Afghanistan
(U) Lessons and Observations From
4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion July 2009 – May 2010
26 July 2010
This unclassified document has been reviewed in accordance with guidance contained in United States Central Command Security Classification Regulation 380-14 dated 13 January 2009. This document contains information EXEMPT FROM MANDATORY DISCLOSURE under the FOIA. DoD Regulation 5400.7R, Exemption 5 applies.
mccll/jtc/v7_0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(U) Purpose: To inform Deputy Commandants (DCs) Combat Development and Integration (CD&I), Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O), Installations and Logistics (I&L) Commanding General (CG), Training and Education Command (TECOM), Director of Intelligence, and others on results of a March 2010 collection effort to document lessons and observations from 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (4th LAR).
Bottom Line Up Front:
(U//FOUO) The battalion mobilized one month prior to participating in Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV). Other than for drill weekends prior to mobilization, this four week period was the only time allotted for pre-deployment training (PTP). While the unit was able to meet all of its requirements, a longer mobilization period should be the goal.
(U//FOUO) During drill weekends, the battalion’s main effort was crew cohesion, conducting gunnery and scout integration and platoon level tactics, focusing on “brilliance of the basics.”
(U//FOUO) EMV was still in the process of converting from Iraq to an Afghanistan focus. It was also oriented around a standard infantry battalion and not an LAR unit.
(U//FOUO) The primary mission of the battalion is combined arms reconnaissance and security missions to shape the battlespace. Many of the operations conducted in Afghanistan were not typical LAR operations.
(U//FOUO) As with other units in Afghanistan, 4th LAR operated in a dispersed and distributed manner, often out of platoon size patrol bases. If such operations continue, the numbers of each vehicle variants may have to be modified to better support them.
(U//FOUO) Fluctuating information on force cap restrictions impacted the mobilization process and the decisions made on the final composition of the unit.
(U//FOUO) The late decision to mobilize the battalion impacted the mobilization process for Navy medical personnel and contributed to the delayed arrival of corpsmen to support the battalion.
(U//FOUO) The lack of replacements for casualties in country increased what was already a shortage of light armored vehicle (LAV) crewman for some of the companies.
(U//FOUO) Marine Corps Base (MCB), Camp Pendleton is a particularly well-suited intermediate location (ILOC) site for mobilizing reserve units, due to its proximity to Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms and EMV, although it may require more capacity and resources to support multiple units.
(U//FOUO) Some Marines continue to outfit themselves with personally procured equipment and gear.
(U//FOUO) While the upgraded LAV, the A2 variant, generally received praise as an overall improvement, many considered it underpowered with the Ballistic Protection Upgrade Package (BPUP) armor additions mounted.
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(U) Recommendations suggested by content of interviews include the following topics and associated doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) pillars.
Recommendation
DOTMLP F
1. (U//FOUO) Increase the number of number of data network specialists on the
X
X
table of organization (T/O)
2. (U//FOUO) Install a power inverter in the LAV
X
3. (U//FOUO) Install an auxiliary power unit (APU) in the LAV
X
4. (U//FOUO) Attach linguists as early in the training period as possible.
X
X
5. (U//FOUO) Deploy LAR units at or above the T/O required number of LAV
X
X
crewmen.
6. (U//FOUO) Supply units with the equipment needed to test turret electronics.
X
7. (U//FOUO) Mobilize reserve units in a timely manner.
X
X X
8. (U//FOUO) Train during PTP on the equipment that will be used in theater.
X
X
9. (U//FOUO) Upgrade all LAVs with Generation II suspensions and more
X
powerful engines.
10. (U//FOUO) Upgrade the communication and computer systems in the
X
command and control variant.
11. (U//FOUO) Determine whether current LAV variants adequately support anticipated future operations.
X
X XX
(U) The remainder of this report contains more detailed background and rationale on the above and other topics. An unclassified version of this report is available at www.mccll.usmc.mil.
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Table of Contents PROLOGUE ............................................................................................................5 BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................6 ORGANIZATION AND MANNING ...........................................................................7 MOBILIZATION .....................................................................................................8 ILOC ....................................................................................................................9 PTP .......................................................................................................................9 EQUIPPING ..........................................................................................................10 OPERATIONS .......................................................................................................15 RECOMMENDATIONS (DOTMLPF PILLAR) .....................................................22 SUMMARY ...........................................................................................................22 ENDNOTES...........................................................................................................23
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Prologue
(U) This report is one of many publications addressing a wide array of topics assembled and produced by the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned. The MCCLL library is not to be considered a sole or authoritative source, and was not designed as such. MCCLL provides a vehicle to inform the operating forces in the queue for subsequent deployments, the DOTMLPF stakeholders, and the advocates of the unvarnished experiences of Marines engaged in operations. Reporting or relaying these experiences may provide the impetus to effect a change in any or all of the DOTMLPF pillars. (U) MCCLL relies on the individual Marine and commands to provide their hard learned lessons in order to disseminate them throughout the Marine Corps. The goal is to get these knowledge jewels into the MCCLL Lesson Management System in order to disseminate them in such a timely manner as to make them invaluable to the next Marine in the deployment queue.
C. H. Sonntag Director, Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned
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Background
(U) This report is a continuation of the collection effort on units supporting operations in Afghanistan as directed by the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration. The collection sought to examine the mission, scope, successes, shortfalls, equipment, manning and emerging issues associated with 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (4th LAR) operations. Interviews of 28 commanders and staff were conducted at various camps and bases in Afghanistan from December 2009 – April 2010. Those interviews cited as endnotes in this report are available in the search enabled MCCLL database at www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil, and can be located by doing a MCCLL site search (Action Menu on left of screen) on the individual‟s last name. (U) The collection also included a survey of some members of the unit. 1
(U) Fourth LAR is a reserve battalion which consists of 7 companies.
Headquarters and Service (H&S) Company and Company A are located in Camp Pendleton, California.
Company B is in Frederick, Maryland.
Company C is in Riverton, Utah.
Company D is in Quantico, Virginia.
Company E is in Syracuse, New York.
Company F is in Eastover, South Carolina.
(U//FOUO) The only companies to participate in the deployment were H&S, A, B, and C, although Company A, 2d LAR also participated in Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV) but deployed separately. Prior to this deployment, the standard practice was to attach individual reserve companies to other units in support of operations.
(U) There was a period of active duty for training (AT) for Companies A, B, and H&S scheduled for June 2009 at Ft Irwin, California. The battalion rescheduled it for July and moved it to Camp Pendleton in anticipation of mobilization, which occurred 1 August 2009. The period was used to complete blocks I and II of the mandated Predeployment Training Program (PTP).
(U) Company C mobilized 20 July 2009 and deployed to Camp Pendleton where it conducted PTP prior to the rest of the battalion mobilizing on 1 August 2009, and the start of unit training at its intermediate location (ILOC), Camp Pendleton. After only a month of training, the battalion moved to 29 Palms, California to participate in EMV.
(U) The LAR battalion performs combined arms reconnaissance and security missions in support of the ground combat element (GCE). Its mission is to conduct reconnaissance, security and economy of force operations, and, within its capabilities, limited offensive or defensive operations that exploit the unit‟s mobility and firepower. 2
(U//FOUO) The relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA) with 2d LAR occurred in November 2009. In addition to responsibilities in southern Helmand, 4th LAR provided 120 man detachments for the tactical security force (base security and quick reaction force (QRF) missions) at both Camp Dwyer and Camp Leatherneck through January 2010. Subsequently, 4th LAR operated out of combat outpost (COP) Payne and patrol base (PB) Khan Neshin Castle.
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(MATERIAL IS OMITTED FROM THIS PORTION DUE TO CLASSIFICATION. SEE CLASSIFIED REPORT)
Organization and Manning
Sourcing
(U//FOUO) While battalion leadership was informally aware that it would be deploying in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the decision was not made to mobilize the battalion until early summer 2009. Another course of action considered was to use an active duty H&S company as the headquarters for the reserve LAR companies. Earlier notice for the activation would have been extremely helpful and given the battalion more time to prepare.
(U//FOUO) Of the Marines who deployed, 90% were selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) Marines from 4th LAR, which included Marines from companies that did not deploy. There were 25 SMCR augments from outside 4th LAR, 8-9 Inspector and Instructor (I&I) staff, and 2 other active duty augments.
(U//FOUO) A force end strength constraint imposed on the battalion by higher headquarters was a substantial issue primarily because it was not set. The number of Marines to deploy with the battalion varied between 400 and 1000 and changed frequently. In the end, more Marines were ready to deploy than could be taken.
(U//FOUO) The battalion received no replacements for combat casualties which resulted in reduced capability due to the lack of certain military occupational specialties (MOSs), especially 0313 LAV crewmen.
(U//FOUO) The civilian education level and backgrounds, particularly law enforcement, of the Reserve Marines were cited as a positive by the leadership in the battalion. According to survey responses, 74% reported having at least some college and 17% had a civilian law enforcement background.
(U//FOUO) While they were able to “get the job done,” Reserve Marines need more than thirty days notice before mobilization.
Navy Sourcing
(U//FOUO) Many of the Navy corpsmen did not join the unit until after mobilization. They were not organic to the battalion and arrived from many different locations, often with no service record book (SRB).
(U//FOUO) The battalion commander viewed the Navy‟s activation process as inflexible. It needs to be more user-friendly, more focused on supporting the Marine Corps with the corpsmen who need to be integrated well in advance of training and not just prior to a major event or deploying into theater. 3
(U//FOUO) The short notice mobilization decision was a factor in the timing of Navy personnel joining the unit. 4
MOS Issues
(U//FOUO) Many leaders noted a shortage of LAV crewmen, MOS 0313. Company C deployed slightly under the table of organization (T/O) number of 49, and subsequently lost approximately two crews‟ worth [MCCLL note: The LAV-25 crew consists of a driver, gunner and vehicle commander. ] The typical solution was to use mechanics as drivers. 5
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(U//FOUO) The battalion had only two MOS 0651 data network specialist Marines to assist in the operation and maintenance of many new communication systems, nearly a regimental suite worth of equipment. While the unit rates four 0651s by T/O, infantry battalions deploying to OEF have as many as nine and are requesting more. 6
Reserve Issues
(U//FOUO) Prior to mobilization, another course of action (COA) under consideration was to attach the reserve LAR companies to an active duty tank battalion headquarters. There is a belief that reserve LAR battalions do not operate as battalions enough to be effective and that it would be better to attach individual reserve companies to an active duty tank battalion. Due to geographic separation and other issues it can be very difficult for reserve LAR battalions to train and deploy together. By the time the decision was made to deploy the LAR battalion, the delay in activating the unit resulted in a workup period that was about a month shorter than many on the staff thought would be optimal and far shorter than the PTP period of an active duty battalion.
Mobilization
Pre-mobilization Issues
(U//FOUO) Companies A and B had sufficient notice about the impending mobilization to adjust their drill schedules, adding in some longer drill weekends of three and four days. To the extent possible, the battalion pushed units to complete PTP requirements on drill weekends but there was only so much training that could be completed during those weekends.
(U//FOUO) Company C learned of the mobilization about two months prior while participating in Exercise African Lion in Morocco, Algeria. Figure 2 is a more optimal timeline for activation of a reserve unit.
Figure 1: Activation Timeline
(U//FOUO) Trainers simulating the upgraded A2 LAV turret were helpful in preparing Marines prior to mobilization. Company C had the turret trainer and recent 0313 graduates of the LAV crewman course at the School of Infantry at Camp Pendleton, CA had trained on the A2 turret.
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The LAVs the battalion would acquire in theater were upgraded A2 variants, so it was important that they train on the system they would be using.
ILOC
(U//FOUO) The unit leadership stated that the ILOC training period was too compressed. A period two to three weeks longer was seen as a reasonable compromise, which would have resulted in four months between mobilization and deployment vice the three that occurred.
(U//FOUO) Camp Pendleton was extremely crowded during ILOC. Staff and officers were billeted at hotels and Marines moved into barracks on the same day that another reserve battalion was departing. The battalion trained and operated effectively but the impact of multiple additional using units must be taken into consideration if Camp Pendleton continues to be the ILOC location of choice due to its proximity to 29 Palms and EMV.
PTP
(U//FOUO) Due to the battalion‟s mission and the compressed nature of the PTP period, the more “standard” events, such as swim qualification, were seen by some as unnecessary impingements on the other training that needed to be accomplished. 7
(U//FOUO) The timeframe in which the battalion had to complete its PTP resulted in a perception of being “focused on checking boxes.” 8 Requirements were seen as constantly changing, with no consistent list or source available. There was very little “white space” left for company or platoon level training between PTP and battalion requirements. 9
(U//FOUO) Vehicle crews and scouts often trained separately. Integrated training is necessary, to include training with crewmen dismounted, as this happens frequently in Afghanistan.
(U//FOUO) The battalion commander, along with his principal staff officers, conducted a predeployment site survey (PDSS) during the last two weeks of August. This visit was cited as a crucial part of the unit‟s subsequent success in EMV and during operations in Afghanistan, despite the resulting absence of key leadership for a significant portion of PTP.
(U//FOUO) The battalion maintenance officer recommended that one of the officers in the unit attend the full electronic warfare officer‟s course and not just the condensed version in theater in order to better understand, employ, and maintain the systems available in theater, primarily the C-IED systems. 10
Enhanced Mojave Viper
(U//FOUO) EMV was in transition between an Iraq focus and an Afghanistan focus. For example, there were still „sheik‟ role players. EMV seemed geared toward regular infantry and not an LAR battalion. Only forty-eight percent of the survey respondents agreed that PTP was adequately focused on operations in Afghanistan rather than Iraq, and only twenty-eight percent said EMV was valuable in preparing them for operations in Afghanistan.
(U//FOUO) The counter improvised explosive device (C-IED) training at EMV was valuable, but it was much shorter than combined arms training evolutions (CAX). These exercises against large units of Soviet style armor were not good preparation for COIN operations in Afghanistan. However, it was still valuable training especially for command and control purposes and deconflicting fires. Company commanders stated that they were “pawns on a chess board,” and conducted less live fire than during similar evolutions when they were on active duty. 11
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(U//FOUO) More exposure to Ground-Based Operational Surveillance System (G-BOSS) and biometric systems, both before and during EMV, would have been beneficial.
(U//FOUO) With companies and platoons regularly operating from separate COPSs and FOBs, more training should have been focused at those levels, especially during EMV. 12
Cultural and Language Training
(U//FOUO) In general, leaders ranked the cultural training as being somewhat more important than the language training. Understanding the culture and customs of the country was seen as the most important part of COIN training. Good linguists can also train Marines in cultural issues.
(U//FOUO) The short period before deployment limited the amount of language training that the Marines received. More training would have been beneficial, but there was not enough time. Even the minimal training was seen as very useful. Knowing just a few phrases builds credibility with local populations.
(U//FOUO) In some areas of the AO the local nationals speak Balochi, but Marines received only Pashto training.
Pre-deployment Intelligence Support
(U//FOUO) Reserve units typically have small S-2 sections while in reserve status. Fourth LAR had two analysts and an infantryman serving as S-2 chief until just prior to mobilization. Before August 2009, there was little opportunity for the S-2 to brief the battalion staff on the AO for which they would be responsible.
(U//FOUO) Having just one secret internet protocol router (SIPR) computer during ILOC/PTP was a major hindrance to developing the intelligence picture. First LAR supported the battalion by providing access to its SIPR vault on weekends.
Equipping
Vehicle Assets
(U//FOUO) Half of the battalion‟s vehicles arrived during the deployment. The approximate numbers of 4th LAR vehicle assets available in theater were:
115 LAVs of all variants
80 other vehicles, including 25 Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) vehicles, 24 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, and 17 MRAP All Terrain Vehicles (MATVs).
Maintenance
(U//FOUO) At the beginning of the deployment, about 10 of 60 LAVs the battalion acquired were dead-lined. By the end of March 2010, the number was 20 out of 115, some from IED strikes, and beyond the repair capability of 4th LAR.
(U//FOUO) There were no maintenance issues unique to Afghanistan. The environment was similar to Iraq or 29 Palms, and maintenance issues were generally the same.
(U//FOUO) The availability of spare parts was a challenge. Parts often arrived at Camp Leatherneck in as little as two days from the United States, but then took 3 weeks to reach COP
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