Economic Crisis in Europe Causes Economic Crisis in Europe
Transcript Of Economic Crisis in Europe Causes Economic Crisis in Europe
ISSN 0379-0991
Economic Crisis in Europe:
Causes, Consequences and Responses
EUROPEAN ECONOMY 7|2009
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
The European Economy series contains important reports and communications from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament on the economic situation and developments, such as the Economic forecasts, the annual EU economy review and the Public finances in EMU report. Subscription terms are shown on the back cover and details on how to obtain the list of sales agents are shown on the inside back cover. Unless otherwise indicated, the texts are published under the responsibility of the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission, BU24, B-1049 Brussels, to which enquiries other than those related to sales and subscriptions should be addressed.
LEGAL NOTICE Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this publication, or for any errors which, despite careful preparation and checking, may appear. More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009 ISBN 978-92-79-11368-0 doi 10.2765/84540 © European Communities, 2009 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. Printed in Luxembourg
European Commission
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs
Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses
EUROPEAN ECONOMY
7/2009
FOREWORD
The European economy is in the midst of the deepest recession since the 1930s, with real GDP projected to shrink by some 4% in 2009, the sharpest contraction in the history of the European Union. Although signs of improvement have appeared recently, recovery remains uncertain and fragile. The EU’s response to the downturn has been swift and decisive. Aside from intervention to stabilise, restore and reform the banking sector, the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) was launched in December 2008. The objective of the EERP is to restore confidence and bolster demand through a coordinated injection of purchasing power into the economy complemented by strategic investments and measures to shore up business and labour markets. The overall fiscal stimulus, including the effects of automatic stabilisers, amounts to 5% of GDP in the EU.
According to the Commission's analysis, unless policies take up the new challenges, potential GDP in the EU could fall to a permanently lower trajectory, due to several factors. First, protracted spells of unemployment in the workforce tend to lead to a permanent loss of skills. Second, the stock of equipment and infrastructure will decrease and become obsolete due to lower investment. Third, innovation may be hampered as spending on research and development is one of the first outlays that businesses cut back on during a recession. Member States have implemented a range of measures to provide temporary support to labour markets, boost investment in public infrastructure and support companies. To ensure that the recovery takes hold and to maintain the EU’s growth potential in the long-run, the focus must increasingly shift from short-term demand management to supply-side structural measures. Failing to do so could impede the restructuring process or create harmful distortions to the Internal Market. Moreover, while clearly necessary, the bold fiscal stimulus comes at a cost. On the current course, public debt in the euro area is projected to reach 100% of GDP by 2014. The Stability and Growth Pact provides the flexibility for the necessary fiscal stimulus in this severe downturn, but consolidation is inevitable once the recovery takes hold and the risk of an economic relapse has diminished sufficiently. While respecting obligations under the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, a differentiated approach across countries is appropriate, taking into account the pace of recovery, fiscal positions and debt levels, as well as the projected costs of ageing, external imbalances and risks in the financial sector.
Preparing exit strategies now, not only for fiscal stimulus, but also for government support for the financial sector and hard-hit industries, will enhance the effectiveness of these measures in the short term, as this depends upon clarity regarding the pace with which such measures will be withdrawn. Since financial markets, businesses and consumers are forward-looking, expectations are factored into decision making today. The precise timing of exit strategies will depend on the strength of the recovery, the exposure of Member States to the crisis and prevailing internal and external imbalances. Part of the fiscal stimulus stemming from the EERP will taper off in 2011, but needs to be followed up by sizeable fiscal consolidation in following years to reverse the unsustainable debt build-up. In the financial sector, government guarantees and holdings in financial institutions will need to be gradually unwound as the private sector gains strength, while carefully balancing financial stability with competitiveness considerations. Close coordination will be important. ‘Vertical’ coordination between the various strands of economic policy (fiscal, structural, financial) will ensure that the withdrawal of government measures is properly sequenced -- an important consideration as turning points may differ across policy areas. ‘Horizontal’ coordination between Member States will help them to avoid or manage cross-border economic spillover effects, to benefit from shared learning and to leverage relationships with the outside world. Moreover, within the euro area, close coordination will ensure that Member States’ growth trajectories do not diverge as the economy recovers. Addressing the underlying causes of diverging competitiveness must be an integral part of any exit strategy. The exit strategy should also ensure that Europe maintains its place at the frontier of the low-carbon revolution by investing in renewable energies, low carbon technologies and "green" infrastructure. The aim of this study is to provide the analytical underpinning of such a coordinated exit strategy.
Marco Buti
Director-General, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission
ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS USED
Member States BE BG CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Denmark Germany Estonia Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Hungary Malta The Netherlands Austria Poland Portugal Romania Slovenia Slovakia Finland Sweden United Kingdom
EA-16
EU-10
EU-15
EU-25 EU-27
Currencies EUR BGN CZK DKK EEK GBP HUF JPY LTL LVL PLN RON SEK
European Union, Member States having adopted the single currency (BE, DE, EL, SI, SK, ES, FR, IE, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT and FI) European Union Member States that joined the EU on 1 May 2004 (CZ, EE, CY, LT, LV, HU, MT, PL, SI, SK) European Union, 15 Member States before 1 May 2004 (BE, DK, DE, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, AT, PT, FI, SE and UK) European Union, 25 Member States before 1 January 2007 European Union, 27 Member States
euro New Bulgarian lev Czech koruna Danish krone Estonian kroon Pound sterling Hungarian forint Japanese yen Lithuanian litas Latvian lats New Polish zloty New Romanian leu Swedish krona
iv
SKK
Slovak koruna
USD
US dollar
Other abbreviations
BEPG
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
CESR
Committee of European Securities Regulators
EA
Euro area
ECB
European Central Bank
ECOFIN
European Council of Economics and Finance Ministers
EDP
Excessive deficit procedure
EMU
Economic and monetary union
ERM II
Exchange Rate Mechanism, mark II
ESCB
European System of Central Banks
Eurostat
Statistical Office of the European Communities
FDI
Foreign direct investment
GDP
Gross domestic product
GDPpc
Gross Domestic Product per capita
GLS
Generalised least squares
HICP
Harmonised index of consumer prices
HP
Hodrick-Prescott filter
ICT
Information and communications technology
IP
Industrial Production
MiFID
Market in Financial Instruments Directive
NAWRU
Non accelerating wage inflation rate of unemployment
NEER
Nominal effective exchange rate
NMS
New Member States
OCA
Optimum currency area
OLS
Ordinary least squares
R&D
Research and development
RAMS
Recently Acceded Member States
REER
Real effective exchange rate
SGP
Stability and Growth Pact
TFP
Total factor productivity
ULC
Unit labour costs
VA
Value added
VAT
Value added tax
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This special edition of the EU Economy: 2009 Review "Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses" was prepared under the responsibility of Marco Buti, Director-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, and István P. Székely, Director for Economic Studies and Research. Paul van den Noord, Adviser in the Directorate for Economic Studies and Research, served as the global editor of the report. The report has drawn on substantive contributions by Ronald Albers, Alfonso Arpaia, Uwe Böwer, Declan Costello, Jan in 't Veld, Lars Jonung, Gabor Koltay, Willem Kooi, Gert-Jan Koopman, Martin Hradisky, Julia Lendvai, Mauro Griorgo Marrano, Gilles Mourre, Michał Narożny, Moisés Orellana Peña, Dario Paternoster, Lucio Pench, Stéphanie Riso, Werner Röger, Eric Ruscher, Alessandra Tucci, Alessandro Turrini, Lukas Vogel and Guntram Wolff. The report benefited from extensive comments by John Berrigan, Daniel Daco, Oliver Dieckmann, Reinhard Felke, Vitor Gaspar, Lars Jonung, Sven Langedijk, Mary McCarthy, Matthias Mors, André Sapir, Massimo Suardi, István P. Székely, Alessandro Turrini, Michael Thiel and David Vergara. Statistical assistance was provided by Adam Kowalski, Daniela Porubska and Christopher Smyth. Adam Kowalski and Greta Haems were responsible for the lay-out of the report.
Comments on the report would be gratefully received and should be sent, by mail or e-mail, to: Paul van den Noord European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Directorate for Economic Studies and Research Office BU-1 05-189 B-1049 Brussels E-mail: [email protected]
vi
CONTENTS
Executive Summary
1. A crisis of historic proportions 2. Vast policy challenges 3. A strong call on EU coordination
Part I:
Anatomy of the crisis
1. Root causes of the crisis
1.1. Introduction 1.2. A chronology of the main events 1.3. Global forces behind the crisis
2. The crisis from a historical perspective
2.1. Introduction 2.2. Great crises in the past 2.3. The policy response then and now 2.4. Lessons from the past
Part II:
Economic consequences of the crisis
1. Impact on actual and potential growth
1.1. Introduction 1.2. The impact on economic activity 1.3. A symmetric shock with asymmetric implications 1.4. The impact of the crisis on potential growth
2. Impact on labour market and employment
2.1. Introduction 2.2. Recent developments 2.3. Labour market expectations 2.4. A comparison with recent recessions
3. Impact on budgetary positions
3.1. Introduction 3.2. Tracking developments in fiscal deficits 3.3. Tracking public debt developments 3.4. Fiscal stress and sovereign risk spreads
4. Impact on global imbalances
4.1. Introduction 4.2. Sources of global imbalances 4.3. Global imbalances since the crisis 4.4. Implications for the EU economy
Part III:
Policy responses
1. A primer on financial crisis policies
1.1. Introduction 1.2. The EU crisis policy framework 1.3. The importance of EU coordination
2. Crisis control and mitigation
1
1 1 5
7
8
8 9 10
14
14 14 18 20
23
24
24 24 27 30
35
35 35 37 38
41
41 41 43 44
46
46 46 48 50
55
56
56 58 59
62
vii
2.1. Introduction
62
2.2. Banking support
62
2.3. Macroeconomic policies
64
2.4. Structural policies
71
3. Crisis resolution and prevention
78
3.1. Introduction
78
3.2. Crisis resolution policies
78
3.3. Crisis prevention
80
4. Policy challenges ahead
82
4.1. Introduction
82
4.2. The pursuit of crisis resolution
82
4.3. The role of EU coordination
85
References
87
LIST OF TABLES
II.1.1. Main features of the Commission forecast
27
II.1.2. The Commission forecast by country
27
III.1.1. Crisis policy frameworks: a conceptional illustration
58
III.2.1. Public interventions in the banking sector
63
III.2.2. Labour market and social protection measures in Member States' recovery
programmes
71
LIST OF GRAPHS
I.1.1. Projected GDP growth for 2009
8
I.1.2. Projected GDP growth for 2010
8
I.1.3. 3-month interbank spreads vs T-bills or OIS
9
I.1.4. Bank lending to private economy in the euro area, 2000-09
10
I.1.5. Corporate 10 year-spreads vs. Government in the euro area, 2000-09
10
I.1.6. Real house prices, 2000-09
12
I.1.7. Stock markets, 2000-09
12
I.2.1. GDP levels during three global crises
15
I.2.2. World average of own tariffs for 35 countries, 1865-1996, un-weighted average,
per cent of GDP
15
I.2.3. World industrial output during the Great Depression and the current crisis
16
I.2.4. The decline in world trade during the crisis of 1929-1933
16
I.2.5. The decline in world trade during the crisis of 2008-2009
16
I.2.6. Unemployment rates during the Great Depression and the present crisis in the
US and Europe
18
II.1.1. Bank lending standards
24
II.1.2. Manufacturing PMI and world trade
24
II.1.3. Quarterly growth rates in the EU
27
II.1.4. Construction activity and current account position
29
II.1.5. Growth composition in current account surplus countries
30
II.1.6. Growth compostion of current account deficit countries
30
II.1.7. Potential growth 2007-2013, euro area
31
viii
Economic Crisis in Europe:
Causes, Consequences and Responses
EUROPEAN ECONOMY 7|2009
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
The European Economy series contains important reports and communications from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament on the economic situation and developments, such as the Economic forecasts, the annual EU economy review and the Public finances in EMU report. Subscription terms are shown on the back cover and details on how to obtain the list of sales agents are shown on the inside back cover. Unless otherwise indicated, the texts are published under the responsibility of the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission, BU24, B-1049 Brussels, to which enquiries other than those related to sales and subscriptions should be addressed.
LEGAL NOTICE Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this publication, or for any errors which, despite careful preparation and checking, may appear. More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009 ISBN 978-92-79-11368-0 doi 10.2765/84540 © European Communities, 2009 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. Printed in Luxembourg
European Commission
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs
Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses
EUROPEAN ECONOMY
7/2009
FOREWORD
The European economy is in the midst of the deepest recession since the 1930s, with real GDP projected to shrink by some 4% in 2009, the sharpest contraction in the history of the European Union. Although signs of improvement have appeared recently, recovery remains uncertain and fragile. The EU’s response to the downturn has been swift and decisive. Aside from intervention to stabilise, restore and reform the banking sector, the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) was launched in December 2008. The objective of the EERP is to restore confidence and bolster demand through a coordinated injection of purchasing power into the economy complemented by strategic investments and measures to shore up business and labour markets. The overall fiscal stimulus, including the effects of automatic stabilisers, amounts to 5% of GDP in the EU.
According to the Commission's analysis, unless policies take up the new challenges, potential GDP in the EU could fall to a permanently lower trajectory, due to several factors. First, protracted spells of unemployment in the workforce tend to lead to a permanent loss of skills. Second, the stock of equipment and infrastructure will decrease and become obsolete due to lower investment. Third, innovation may be hampered as spending on research and development is one of the first outlays that businesses cut back on during a recession. Member States have implemented a range of measures to provide temporary support to labour markets, boost investment in public infrastructure and support companies. To ensure that the recovery takes hold and to maintain the EU’s growth potential in the long-run, the focus must increasingly shift from short-term demand management to supply-side structural measures. Failing to do so could impede the restructuring process or create harmful distortions to the Internal Market. Moreover, while clearly necessary, the bold fiscal stimulus comes at a cost. On the current course, public debt in the euro area is projected to reach 100% of GDP by 2014. The Stability and Growth Pact provides the flexibility for the necessary fiscal stimulus in this severe downturn, but consolidation is inevitable once the recovery takes hold and the risk of an economic relapse has diminished sufficiently. While respecting obligations under the Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact, a differentiated approach across countries is appropriate, taking into account the pace of recovery, fiscal positions and debt levels, as well as the projected costs of ageing, external imbalances and risks in the financial sector.
Preparing exit strategies now, not only for fiscal stimulus, but also for government support for the financial sector and hard-hit industries, will enhance the effectiveness of these measures in the short term, as this depends upon clarity regarding the pace with which such measures will be withdrawn. Since financial markets, businesses and consumers are forward-looking, expectations are factored into decision making today. The precise timing of exit strategies will depend on the strength of the recovery, the exposure of Member States to the crisis and prevailing internal and external imbalances. Part of the fiscal stimulus stemming from the EERP will taper off in 2011, but needs to be followed up by sizeable fiscal consolidation in following years to reverse the unsustainable debt build-up. In the financial sector, government guarantees and holdings in financial institutions will need to be gradually unwound as the private sector gains strength, while carefully balancing financial stability with competitiveness considerations. Close coordination will be important. ‘Vertical’ coordination between the various strands of economic policy (fiscal, structural, financial) will ensure that the withdrawal of government measures is properly sequenced -- an important consideration as turning points may differ across policy areas. ‘Horizontal’ coordination between Member States will help them to avoid or manage cross-border economic spillover effects, to benefit from shared learning and to leverage relationships with the outside world. Moreover, within the euro area, close coordination will ensure that Member States’ growth trajectories do not diverge as the economy recovers. Addressing the underlying causes of diverging competitiveness must be an integral part of any exit strategy. The exit strategy should also ensure that Europe maintains its place at the frontier of the low-carbon revolution by investing in renewable energies, low carbon technologies and "green" infrastructure. The aim of this study is to provide the analytical underpinning of such a coordinated exit strategy.
Marco Buti
Director-General, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission
ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS USED
Member States BE BG CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK
Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Denmark Germany Estonia Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Hungary Malta The Netherlands Austria Poland Portugal Romania Slovenia Slovakia Finland Sweden United Kingdom
EA-16
EU-10
EU-15
EU-25 EU-27
Currencies EUR BGN CZK DKK EEK GBP HUF JPY LTL LVL PLN RON SEK
European Union, Member States having adopted the single currency (BE, DE, EL, SI, SK, ES, FR, IE, IT, CY, LU, MT, NL, AT, PT and FI) European Union Member States that joined the EU on 1 May 2004 (CZ, EE, CY, LT, LV, HU, MT, PL, SI, SK) European Union, 15 Member States before 1 May 2004 (BE, DK, DE, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, AT, PT, FI, SE and UK) European Union, 25 Member States before 1 January 2007 European Union, 27 Member States
euro New Bulgarian lev Czech koruna Danish krone Estonian kroon Pound sterling Hungarian forint Japanese yen Lithuanian litas Latvian lats New Polish zloty New Romanian leu Swedish krona
iv
SKK
Slovak koruna
USD
US dollar
Other abbreviations
BEPG
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
CESR
Committee of European Securities Regulators
EA
Euro area
ECB
European Central Bank
ECOFIN
European Council of Economics and Finance Ministers
EDP
Excessive deficit procedure
EMU
Economic and monetary union
ERM II
Exchange Rate Mechanism, mark II
ESCB
European System of Central Banks
Eurostat
Statistical Office of the European Communities
FDI
Foreign direct investment
GDP
Gross domestic product
GDPpc
Gross Domestic Product per capita
GLS
Generalised least squares
HICP
Harmonised index of consumer prices
HP
Hodrick-Prescott filter
ICT
Information and communications technology
IP
Industrial Production
MiFID
Market in Financial Instruments Directive
NAWRU
Non accelerating wage inflation rate of unemployment
NEER
Nominal effective exchange rate
NMS
New Member States
OCA
Optimum currency area
OLS
Ordinary least squares
R&D
Research and development
RAMS
Recently Acceded Member States
REER
Real effective exchange rate
SGP
Stability and Growth Pact
TFP
Total factor productivity
ULC
Unit labour costs
VA
Value added
VAT
Value added tax
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This special edition of the EU Economy: 2009 Review "Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses" was prepared under the responsibility of Marco Buti, Director-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, and István P. Székely, Director for Economic Studies and Research. Paul van den Noord, Adviser in the Directorate for Economic Studies and Research, served as the global editor of the report. The report has drawn on substantive contributions by Ronald Albers, Alfonso Arpaia, Uwe Böwer, Declan Costello, Jan in 't Veld, Lars Jonung, Gabor Koltay, Willem Kooi, Gert-Jan Koopman, Martin Hradisky, Julia Lendvai, Mauro Griorgo Marrano, Gilles Mourre, Michał Narożny, Moisés Orellana Peña, Dario Paternoster, Lucio Pench, Stéphanie Riso, Werner Röger, Eric Ruscher, Alessandra Tucci, Alessandro Turrini, Lukas Vogel and Guntram Wolff. The report benefited from extensive comments by John Berrigan, Daniel Daco, Oliver Dieckmann, Reinhard Felke, Vitor Gaspar, Lars Jonung, Sven Langedijk, Mary McCarthy, Matthias Mors, André Sapir, Massimo Suardi, István P. Székely, Alessandro Turrini, Michael Thiel and David Vergara. Statistical assistance was provided by Adam Kowalski, Daniela Porubska and Christopher Smyth. Adam Kowalski and Greta Haems were responsible for the lay-out of the report.
Comments on the report would be gratefully received and should be sent, by mail or e-mail, to: Paul van den Noord European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Directorate for Economic Studies and Research Office BU-1 05-189 B-1049 Brussels E-mail: [email protected]
vi
CONTENTS
Executive Summary
1. A crisis of historic proportions 2. Vast policy challenges 3. A strong call on EU coordination
Part I:
Anatomy of the crisis
1. Root causes of the crisis
1.1. Introduction 1.2. A chronology of the main events 1.3. Global forces behind the crisis
2. The crisis from a historical perspective
2.1. Introduction 2.2. Great crises in the past 2.3. The policy response then and now 2.4. Lessons from the past
Part II:
Economic consequences of the crisis
1. Impact on actual and potential growth
1.1. Introduction 1.2. The impact on economic activity 1.3. A symmetric shock with asymmetric implications 1.4. The impact of the crisis on potential growth
2. Impact on labour market and employment
2.1. Introduction 2.2. Recent developments 2.3. Labour market expectations 2.4. A comparison with recent recessions
3. Impact on budgetary positions
3.1. Introduction 3.2. Tracking developments in fiscal deficits 3.3. Tracking public debt developments 3.4. Fiscal stress and sovereign risk spreads
4. Impact on global imbalances
4.1. Introduction 4.2. Sources of global imbalances 4.3. Global imbalances since the crisis 4.4. Implications for the EU economy
Part III:
Policy responses
1. A primer on financial crisis policies
1.1. Introduction 1.2. The EU crisis policy framework 1.3. The importance of EU coordination
2. Crisis control and mitigation
1
1 1 5
7
8
8 9 10
14
14 14 18 20
23
24
24 24 27 30
35
35 35 37 38
41
41 41 43 44
46
46 46 48 50
55
56
56 58 59
62
vii
2.1. Introduction
62
2.2. Banking support
62
2.3. Macroeconomic policies
64
2.4. Structural policies
71
3. Crisis resolution and prevention
78
3.1. Introduction
78
3.2. Crisis resolution policies
78
3.3. Crisis prevention
80
4. Policy challenges ahead
82
4.1. Introduction
82
4.2. The pursuit of crisis resolution
82
4.3. The role of EU coordination
85
References
87
LIST OF TABLES
II.1.1. Main features of the Commission forecast
27
II.1.2. The Commission forecast by country
27
III.1.1. Crisis policy frameworks: a conceptional illustration
58
III.2.1. Public interventions in the banking sector
63
III.2.2. Labour market and social protection measures in Member States' recovery
programmes
71
LIST OF GRAPHS
I.1.1. Projected GDP growth for 2009
8
I.1.2. Projected GDP growth for 2010
8
I.1.3. 3-month interbank spreads vs T-bills or OIS
9
I.1.4. Bank lending to private economy in the euro area, 2000-09
10
I.1.5. Corporate 10 year-spreads vs. Government in the euro area, 2000-09
10
I.1.6. Real house prices, 2000-09
12
I.1.7. Stock markets, 2000-09
12
I.2.1. GDP levels during three global crises
15
I.2.2. World average of own tariffs for 35 countries, 1865-1996, un-weighted average,
per cent of GDP
15
I.2.3. World industrial output during the Great Depression and the current crisis
16
I.2.4. The decline in world trade during the crisis of 1929-1933
16
I.2.5. The decline in world trade during the crisis of 2008-2009
16
I.2.6. Unemployment rates during the Great Depression and the present crisis in the
US and Europe
18
II.1.1. Bank lending standards
24
II.1.2. Manufacturing PMI and world trade
24
II.1.3. Quarterly growth rates in the EU
27
II.1.4. Construction activity and current account position
29
II.1.5. Growth composition in current account surplus countries
30
II.1.6. Growth compostion of current account deficit countries
30
II.1.7. Potential growth 2007-2013, euro area
31
viii